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THE NEW SENTENCING LAW
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
Rummel v. Estelle
The Supreme Court's latest decisions on this
issue, however, make it unlikely that the application of the new statute will be successfully
challenged on this ground. In Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980), the defendant challenged a
mandatory life sentence, imposed pursuant to a
Texas recidivist statute, as a violation of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause. Rummel was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. He
had been convicted of two prior felonies. The first
conviction was for the fraudulent use of a credit
card in which he had obtained $80 worth of goods
and services; the second conviction was for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Rummel argued that the imposition of a mandatory life
sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the
three felonies that formed the predicate for his
sentence." /d. at 265.
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences have been exceedingly rare." /d. at 272.
The one noncapital case in which the argument
was successful, Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910),
involved an unusual form of punishment known as
cadena temporal, which required imprisonment
with "a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from
friend or relative, nor marital authority or parental
rights or rights of property, no participation even in
family council." /d. at 366. The fact that Rummel's
crimes were nonviolent and involved small
amounts of money were of no consequence. The
Court's "hands off" policy in Rummel places a
heavy burden on a defendant claiming a disproportionate sentence in a noncapital case. See generally Note, Terrebonne v. Blackburn: The Proportionality Principle in the Fifth Circuit After Rummel
V. Estelle, 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1365 (1982).

Ohio's new sentencing law raises a number of
important constitutional and statutory issues.
Several of these issues are examined briefly in this
article. See generally Note, S.B.199: Ohio Adopts a
Mandatory Sentencing Measure, 8 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 425 (1983).
An initial problem with the new law is its complexity and use of confusing terminology. For example, there are two types of "actual incarceration" in the new law. Aggravated-felony actual incarceration may be diminshed by good time; firearms-offender actual incarceration may not be
reduced by good time. RC 2929.01(C) &
2929.71(D)(2). There is now a general classification
of offenses known as "aggravated felonies," which
must be distinguished from specific crimes such
as aggravated murder and aggravated burglary.
Prior to the new law, Ohio had six classifications
for felonies: aggravated murder, murder, and
felonies of the first, second, third, and fourth
degree. With the addition of the new classifications of aggravated felonies of the first, second,
and third degree, there are now nine classifications.
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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
One of the principal effects of the new law will
be the imposition of increased criminal sentences.
The new categories of "aggravated felonies" involve enhanced punishments for offenses falling
within these categories. In addition, the firearms
provision, RC 2929.71, automatically adds three
years to the term of confinement and each firearms-related offense triggers a new three-year consecutive prison term.
These increased penalties raise the issue of
whether, in a particular case, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment may be violated. U.S. Canst. amend.
VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). As one commentator has
noted, the "prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment would ... appear to bar punishment
authorized by statute which is excessive, that is,
out of all proportion to the offense
committed .... " W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal
Law 164 (1972). Several Supreme Court decisions
contain statements supporting this view. See
Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("[l]t is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime be
graduated and proportioned to offense."); lngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) ("Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause ... proscr1bes
punishment grossly disportionate to the severity of
the crime .... ");Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958).

Hutto v. Davis
The Court next considered the proportionality
issue in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982). Davis
was convicted in a state court of possession with
intent to distribute and distribution of marihuana,
for which a jury imposed a $10,000 fine and two
consecutive 20-year prison terms. He argued that a
forty-year sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the crime of possessing less than nine
ounces of marihuana that it constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. A federal district court
agreed and granted the defendant habeas relief, a
decision that was upheld by the Fourth Circuit sitting en bane.
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed. According to the Court, "Rummel
stands for the proposition that federal courts
5

should be 'reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,' ... and that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare' ... "
/d. at 460, quoting Rummel v. Estelle. In a footnote
the Court provided an example of the "rare" case
in which the proportionality argument might be
successful: "We noted in Rummel that there could
be situations in which the proportionality principle
would come into play, such as "if a legislature
made overtime parking a felony punishable by life
imprisonment." /d. at 374 n. 3.
The Court is presently considering another case
in which the proportionality argument has been
raised. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982). In Helms the
Eighth Circuit held that the imposition of a life
sentence without parole for a habitual offender
violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
The court distinguished Rummel on two grounds.
First, Rummel's life sentence did not preclude the
possibility of parole. Second, Helms was an alcoholic, a factor that contributed to his present and
prior convictions. The Supreme Court heard arguments on March 29, 1983. See 33 Grim. L. Rptr.
4003 (1983).

the court, the "legislature has inherent power to
create classifications if such classifications are 1
reasonable and some legitimate state interest is
advanced." /d. at 366, 445 N.E.2d at 669.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The new sentencing law provides that a person
who either uses a firearm or has a firearm on or
about his person or under his control at the time
of the commission of an offense will serve three
years of incarceration in addition to the sentence
for the substantive offense for which he is convicted. RC 2929.71. Under this provision, it could
be argued that the defendant is being subjected t
double punishment in violation of the double
jeopardy clause. U.S. Canst. amend. V ("[N]or sha
any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). See general
/y C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure ch. 24 (1980)
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), th
Supreme Court stated that the double jeopardy
clause "protects against multipl'e punishments to
the same offense." /d. at 717. See also U.S. v.
Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-308 (1931); Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169, 173 (1873) ("[T]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the
criminal from being twice punished for the same
offence as from being twice tried for it.").

Ohio Cases
The Ohio Constitution also contains a cruel and
unusual punishment clause. Ohio Canst. art. I, § 9.
The Ohio courts, however, have followed the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court and rejected proportionality attacks on sentences.
In McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d 68, 203
N.E.2d 334 (1964), the court recognized that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits "puni9hments which
are so disproportionate to the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community." /d. at 69, 203
N.E.2d at 336. In applying this standard in State v.
Chaffin, 30 Ohio St. 2d 13, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), the
court held "that the 20-to 40-year sentence imposed [for the sale of marijuana] does not constitute
cruel or unusual punishment." /d. at 17, 282,
N.E.2d 49. Significantly, the defendant in Chaffin
based his challenge on state as well as federal
constitutional grounds. See also State v. Juliano,
24 Ohio St. 117, 120, 265 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1970)
("[l]f a sentence falls within the terms of a valid
statute, it will not amount to a 'cruel and unusual
punishment.' ");State v. Wilkinson, 17 Ohio St. 2d
9, 244 N.E.2d 480, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969);
State v. Abercrombie, 40 Ohio App. 2d 89, 318
N. E.2d 179 (1973).
In State v. Bonello, 3 Ohio App. 3d 365, 445,
N.E.2d 667 (1981), the defendant argued that the
imposition of a mandatory sentence of actual incarceration imposed pursuant to RC 2925.03 for
the sale of LSD was a cruel and unusual punishment. Rejecting this argument, the court commented: "Long terms of imprisonment in drug offense cases have been upheld for much less aggravated offenses than in the instant case." /d. at
366, 445 N.E.2d at 670. The court also rejected the
defendant's equal protection claim. According to

Missouri v. Hunter
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issu
of multiple punishments in Missouri v. Hunter, 10:
S. Ct. 673 (1983). Based on participation in a robbery of an A & P store in which he used a weapor
Hunter was convicted of first degree robbery and
armed criminal action. Under Missouri law, armed
criminal action is defined as follows:
[A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws
of this state by, with, or through the use, assistance,
or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilt)
of the crime of armed criminal action and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment by the dh
sion of corrections for a term of not less than three
years. The punishment imposed pursuant to this sub
section shall be in addition to any punishment provic
ed by law for the crime committed by, with, or throu~
the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly
weapon. No person under this subsection shall be
eligible for parole, probation, conditional release or
suspended imposition or execution of sentence for a
period of three calendar years. /d. at 676.

Hunter was sentenced to concurrent terms of 1
years for first degree robbery and 15 years for am
ed criminal action. The Missouri Supreme Court
held that armed criminal action and the underlyin
felony were "the same offense'~ for purposes of
the double jeopardy clause and therefore the imposition of punishment for both offenses was pro
hibited. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed.
According to the Court, "[w]ith respect to
cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, th
Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than pre6
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by the Ohio Constitution, with the Ohio Supreme
Court .... ").
The issue is whether the right to release after
conviction is a procedural right, in which case the
rule controls, or a substantive right, in which case
the statute controls. In interpreting section 5(8),
the Supreme Court has written: " 'Substantive'
means the body of law which creates, defines and
regulates the rights of the parties." Krause v.
State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 145, 285 N.E.2d 736, 744
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). This definition is
not particularly helpful and the resolution of this
conflict will probably have to await Supreme Court
review. See also State v. Slatter, 66 Ohio St. 2d
452, 423, N.E.2d 100 (1981); State v. Waller, 47 Ohio
St. 2d 52, 351 N.E.2d 195 (1976). See generally
Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence:
The General Assembly, Evidence, and Ru/emaking,
29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 16, 33-59 (1978).

vent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended." /d. at
678. In a subsequent passage, the Court wrote that
"simply because two criminal statutes may be
construed to proscribe the same conduct ... does
not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes." /d.
at 679. Since the Missouri Supreme Court had
found that the legislature specifically intended to
impose cumulative punishments, Hunter had suffered no constitutional deprivation. To remove any
remaining doubt, the Court added: "Legislatures,
not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments."
/d.
Ohio Cases
The Ohio Supreme Court has also addressed
this issue. In State v. Moss, 69 Ohio St. 2d 515, 433
N.E.2d 181 (1982), the defendant challenged the imposition of consecutive sentences for aggravated
murder and aggravated burglary on the ground that
his sentence violated both the federal and state
double jeopardy clauses. See Ohio Canst. art. I, §
10 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense."). In rejecting this argument, the
court wrote: "In determining the constitutionality
of the trial court's imposition in a single criminal
proceeding of consecutive sentences, appellate
review is limited to ensuring that the trial court did
not exceed the sentencing authority which the
General Assembly granted it." /d. (syllabus 1). See
a/so State v. Royster, 3 Ohio App. 3d 442, 446
N.E.2d 190 (1982).

CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPT
RC 2923.01(J) contains the penalty section for
conspiracy. Subdivision (1) of that provision remains unchanged; a person is guilty of a felony of
the first degree "when one of the objects of the
conspiracy is aggravated murder or murder." Subdivision (2) has been amended. It now provides
that a person is guilty of a "felony of the next
lesser degree than the most serious offense that is
the object of the conspiracy, when the most serious offense that is the object of the conspiracy is
an aggravated felony of the first, second, or third
degree, or a felony of the first second, or third
degree." The issue is whether conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony of the first degree is an
aggravated felony of the second degree or a felony
of the first degree.
A similar issue arises with respect to attempts.
RC 2923.02(E) provides: "An attempt to commit aggravated murder or murder is a felony of the first
degree. An attempt to commit any other offense is
an offense of the next lesser degree than the offense attempted." The penalty provision, RC
2929.11, lists offenses in the following order: aggravated felony of the first degree, felony of the
first degree, aggravated felony of the second
degree, felony of the second degree, and so forth.
It seems doubtful, however, that the issue can be
resolved merely by reference to this provision.
The controlling statute should be RC 2901.04(A),
which provides: "Sections of the Revised Code
defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in
favor of the accused." This statement is a codification of the rule long recognized in Ohio as well
as in other jurisdictions. See Harrison v. State, 112
Ohio St. 429, 147 N.E. 650 (1925), aff'd, 270 U.S. 632
(1926); State ex rei. Moore Oil Co. V. Dauben, 99
Ohio St. 406, 124 N.E. 232 (1919). The rationale for
the rule is fair warning. As Justice Holmes has
commented: "Although it i~ not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law
before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a

RELEASE ON APPEAL
Amended RC 2949.02 prohibits a trial court from
releasing a defendant on his own recognizance if
convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or an aggravated felony. This amendment conflicts with
Criminal Rule 46(E), which governs release after
conviction. Rule 46 does not prohibit release on
recognizance after conviction in cases involving
these offenses.
This conflict raises a state constitutional issue.
Article IV, section 5(8) of the Ohio Constitution
provides: "The supreme court shall prescribe rules
governing practice and procedure in all courts of
the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right. ... All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect." Under
this constitutional provision, procedural rules promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court control over
conflicting statutory provisions. See Milligan &
Pohlman, The 1968Modern Courts Amendment to
the Ohio Constitution, 29 Ohio St. L.J. 811, 829
(1968) ("There should now be no doubt that the
authority of the Supreme Court in the rule-making
area is plenary. Court action in this area supersedes contradictory legislation."); Note, Substance
and Procedure: The Scope of Judicial Rule Making
Authority in Ohio, 37 Ohio St. L.J. 364, 382 (1976)
("[R]esponsibility for judicial procedure is placed,
7

fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible
the line should be clear." McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S.
25, 27 (1931). See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Criminal Law 72-74 (1972).

specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is suf-1
ficient culpability to commit the offense."
In addition to these issues, the new law raises a
number of policy issues. One issue concerns the
effect the law will have on the already overcrowded state prison system. The Columbus Correctional Facility is subject to a federal court consent
decree that requires closing that facility by
December 31, 1983. The Ohio State Reformatory
(Mansfield) is subject to a federal court consent
decree, conditionally approved, that requires closing the existing cellblocks of that institution by
i987. Although new facilities are planned for
Cleveland, Dayton, Chillicothe, and possibily Columbus, construction has not commenced.

CONCLUSION

Several issues raised by the new sentencing
statute have been examined in this article. Undoubtedly, there are other issues. For example, the
firearms provision, RC 2929.71, does not specify a
mental element (mens rea) for possession or control of a firearm. RC 2901.21 would appear to control. It provides that "[w]hen the section neither
* * *

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Evidence: Fyre v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980); McCormick,
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to
Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879 (1982)
Second, Williams is important because it permits the use of voiceprint evidence. Unfortunately,
the court was apparently unaware of the most recent report on voiceprints. See National Academy
of Sciences, On the Theory and Practice of Voice
Identification (1979). This report, the only independent report on the subject, was not cited by the
court in Williams. According to the report, the erro
rates reported in the p"rior studies "do not constitute a generally adequate basis for a judicial or
legislative body to use in making judgements concerning the reliability and acceptability of auralvisual voice identification in forensic
applications." /d. at 60. In other words, even when
applying the approach to novel scientific evidence
outlined in Williams, the admissibility of voiceprin
evidence is highly questionable. FBI policy is to
use voiceprints for investigative purposes only: FE
voiceprint experts do not testify in court. See
Koenig, Speaker lndentification (Part 2), FBI Law
Enforcement Bull. 20, 22 (Feb. 1980).

In State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E. 2d
444 (1983), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled voiceprint evidence admissible. The case is significant
for two reasons. First, the court in Williams changed the standard for admitting novel scientific evidence. Prior to Williams, the court had followed
the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923). Under the Frye test, novel
scientific evidence is admissible only if it has
"gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs." /d. at 1014. See State v.
Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 518, 521-22, 423 N.E. 2d 137,
140 (1981) (battered wife syndrome not generally
accepted). The court explicitly rejected the general
acceptance test in Williams. Instead, admissibility
is now determined by applying the rules governing
relevancy, Ohio Evid. R. 401-403, and expert testimony, Ohio Evid. R. 702. "We believe the Rules of
Evidence established adequate preconditions for
admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to
the discretion of this state's judiciary, on a case
by case basis, to decide whether the questioned
testimony is relevant and will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue." 446 N.E. 2d at 448. See generally
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
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